Safeguarding Digital Sovereignty in the Quantum Era
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20570657Keywords:
Digital Sovereignty, National Information Control, Critical Digital Services, Cryptographic Independence, Foreign Provider Risk, Authentication Infrastructure, Encryption And Confidentiality, Resilient Digital Systems, Supply Chain Diversity, Service Quality Assurance, Quantum Computing Impact, Classical Cryptography Vulnerability, Public-Key Cryptography Breakdown, Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption, Post-Quantum Key Management, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Data Confidentiality And Integrity, Transition-Phase Security Risks, Long-Term Communication Security, Sovereignty-Oriented Cyber Strategy.Abstract
Digital sovereignty encompasses a nation or region’s control over information and services crucial to the nation state. This involves making essential decisions about security, economic, ethical, and political factors contributing to the provisioning of those services. National digital sovereignty risk being compromised when critical services such as authentication, signing, encryption, or confidentiality are provided by foreign providers. Sovereignty in general can also be considered more broadly at the regional level and include other service attributes, such as resilience, diversity of supply, and quality.
The increasing arrival of quantum computers will undermine classical public-key cryptography. Although the development of practical quantum computers is not imminent, governments, regulators, and other owners of critical infrastructure must urgently begin adopting post-quantum key-management solutions as part of a wider digital-sovereignty strategy. Failure to do so will not only compromise the confidentiality and integrity of data exchanged over many years, but also introduce a risk of undetected abuse of those communications during the transition. The increasing arrival of quantum computers will undermine classical public-key cryptography. Although the development of practical quantum computers is not imminent, governments, regulators, and other owners of critical infrastructure must urgently begin adopting post-quantum key-management solutions as part of a wider digital-sovereignty strategy. Failure to do so will not only compromise the confidentiality and integrity of data exchanged over many years, but also introduce a risk of undetected abuse of those communications during the transition.
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